The Largest Carrier Battle In History Was So One-Sided The Pilots Called It A Turkey Shoot
14 min read
At about ten o'clock on the morning of the nineteenth of June, nineteen forty-four, a radar operator aboard an American warship west of Guam picked up a cluster of contacts. They were a hundred and fifty miles out, and they were coming straight for the fleet.
That cluster was the first of four Japanese air raids. Before the sun went down, Japan would lose more than three hundred carrier planes. The Americans would lose about thirty.
It was the largest carrier battle ever fought. Twenty-four aircraft carriers, fifteen American and nine Japanese, and it turned into one of the most lopsided days in the history of air combat. One of the pilots who flew that day came back to his ship and said it was like an old-time turkey shoot back home. The name stuck.
Those numbers come from the Navy's own records and from Japanese losses counted after the war. They are not a legend that grew in the telling.
So how does a battle that big go that wrong for one side? There are four reasons, and only one of them is the airplane everyone talks about. After that, there's what happened under the sea on the same day, and the night that followed, when an American admiral did something no carrier commander was supposed to do.
To see why it went the way it did, you have to start with the plan, because the Japanese plan was good.
By June nineteen forty-four the Americans were landing on Saipan in the Mariana Islands. From Saipan, the new B twenty-nine bombers could reach Japan itself. Tokyo knew it. The Imperial Navy had spent months rebuilding its carrier force for exactly this moment, and it called the plan A-Go.
The commander was Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburō. He had nine carriers and a little over four hundred carrier planes. The Americans had more of everything. Admiral Raymond Spruance commanded the Fifth Fleet, and under him Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher led Task Force Fifty-Eight: fifteen carriers, more than nine hundred planes, seven fast battleships.
Ozawa couldn't win a straight fight, so he planned not to have one.
His planes had one real advantage. Japanese carrier aircraft were light. They carried little armor and no self-sealing fuel tanks, which made them easy to set on fire, but it also gave them range. They could strike from around three hundred miles. The American planes needed to be much closer than that.
So Ozawa would stay out of reach. His planes would fly out, hit the American carriers, and keep going east to land on Guam, where they could refuel, rearm and hit the Americans again on the way home. The American carriers would be caught between the Japanese fleet and the Japanese airfields on Guam, Tinian and Rota.
On paper it was smart. It used the one thing Japan still had more of, which was range.
Spruance had his own problem. His first job was to protect the invasion force off Saipan, the transports and the men on the beach. On the night of the eighteenth of June, Mitscher asked to steam west through the night and close with the Japanese fleet so he could hit it at dawn. Spruance said no. He was afraid the Japanese would slip around him and get at the beachhead.
The aviators were furious. They thought Spruance was throwing away the chance of the war. But his decision meant Task Force Fifty-Eight would sit and wait to be attacked.
The first reason is the men in the cockpits.
In nineteen forty-two Japan had some of the best naval aviators in the world. They had flown over Pearl Harbor, the Indian Ocean and Midway. By nineteen forty-four most of them were dead. Midway took a lot of them. The long fight over Guadalcanal and the Solomons took more, and a year of steady losses over Rabaul took most of what was left.
Japan never built a training system that could replace them. Some of the young men flying off Ozawa's carriers in June nineteen forty-four had gone into action after only about three months of training. Many had never flown in combat at all. Some struggled just to land on a carrier deck.
The Americans had gone the other way. The Navy kept its best pilots back home to teach, and it trained new men for a long time before it sent them out. Many of the pilots in Task Force Fifty-Eight had spent around two years in training. They had flown real missions over the islands in the months before. They knew their planes, and they knew each other.
You can have a clever plan. You still need men who can fly it.
The second reason is a machine most viewers never see, because it sat in a dark room deep inside the ship.
By nineteen forty-four every big American warship had a Combat Information Center. It was a room full of radar screens, plotting boards and radio sets. Radar picked up incoming planes far out. Officers plotted their course and height. Then a fighter director, sitting in that room, talked his Hellcats onto the enemy by radio, telling them which way to turn, how high to climb and how far to go.
So on the nineteenth of June, there was no surprise. Radar saw the first raid about a hundred and fifty miles out. Then the Japanese planes did something that cost them. They stopped and circled to sort out their formations, and that gave the Americans time to scramble.
By the time that raid arrived, the Hellcats were already waiting above it.
The third reason is the airplane itself, the Grumman F six F Hellcat.
There's a story that the Hellcat was built to beat the Zero. It wasn't. The Navy ordered it in June nineteen forty-one, months before Pearl Harbor, as a bigger and stronger follow-on to the Wildcat. Combat reports about the Zero shaped some of the details, but the airplane was already on the way.
What it had was power and toughness. It used the big Pratt and Whitney R twenty-eight hundred engine, armor around the pilot, and fuel tanks that sealed themselves when they were hit. A Hellcat could take a burst of fire and get its pilot home. A Japanese plane hit in the same place would often go down in flames.
Put a well-trained pilot in a Hellcat, have a fighter director put him above the enemy before the fight starts, and send young men with three months of training against him in planes that burn easily. You get the nineteenth of June.
The fourth reason is the one that surprises people, and it's the guns, because they mostly weren't needed.
The American fleet was bristling with antiaircraft guns. Its five-inch guns now fired shells with the new proximity fuze, which exploded when it sensed a plane nearby instead of needing a direct hit. That fuze was one of the great secret weapons of the war.
But on the nineteenth of June, almost all of the Japanese planes that went down were shot down by fighters, far out from the fleet. The guns got only a small share. Very few Japanese planes ever got close enough to give the gunners a target. The battle was decided out over the sea, miles before the ships were in any danger.
The first raid had sixty-eight planes. Hellcats met it at ten thirty-six, about seventy miles from the fleet. In the first few minutes they shot down twenty-five Japanese planes and lost one of their own. More went down as the raid pressed on. A handful of bombers broke through and reached Admiral Willis Lee's battleships. One bomb hit the South Dakota and killed or wounded more than fifty men, but she stayed in formation. Of the sixty-eight planes in the first raid, forty-one never came back.
The second raid was bigger, a hundred and seven planes, picked up on radar at seven minutes past eleven. The Hellcats met it about sixty miles out and tore it apart before it reached the fleet. A few planes got through. A torpedo exploded in the wake of the carrier Enterprise. A plane crashed into the side of the battleship Indiana. It didn't stop her. Of those hundred and seven planes, ninety-seven were destroyed.
This is the raid that produced the battle's best-known photograph.
Lieutenant Alex Vraciu flew a Hellcat with Fighting Squadron Sixteen off the carrier Lexington. His engine's supercharger was giving him trouble and he couldn't climb as high as the others. Then his fighter director sent him toward a group of Japanese dive bombers. In about eight minutes he shot down six of them. He used only three hundred and sixty rounds of ammunition. Back on the Lexington, a photographer caught him holding up six fingers, grinning.
He wasn't alone. Commander David McCampbell, leading the air group from the Essex, shot down at least seven Japanese planes that day.
The third raid mostly couldn't find the American fleet at all. The fourth raid got lost too, and many of its planes headed for Guam to land. American fighters were waiting over the airfield at Orote. They shot down thirty of the forty-nine planes that tried to land there, and the rest were wrecked on the ground.
Out of three hundred and seventy-three planes Ozawa sent out in four raids, two hundred and forty-three were lost. Add the planes shot down over Guam, and Japan lost more than three hundred aircraft in a single day.
Back on the Lexington, when the pilots came down to talk it over, one of them said it was like an old-time turkey shoot down home. By the end of the day, the whole fleet was calling it the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.
But the worst of Japan's day hadn't come from the air at all.
While the Hellcats were working, two American submarines were already inside Ozawa's fleet.
At sixteen minutes past eight that morning, the submarine Albacore, under Lieutenant Commander James Blanchard, got into position on a big Japanese carrier. It was the Taiho, the newest carrier in the Japanese fleet, built with an armored flight deck. It was also Ozawa's flagship.
Then Albacore's torpedo fire-control computer failed. Blanchard couldn't wait for it. He fired six torpedoes by eye, in a spread.
Four missed. A Japanese pilot named Sakio Komatsu had just taken off from the Taiho. He saw a torpedo running at his ship and dived his plane straight into it. The torpedo blew up and he was killed. One torpedo still hit the Taiho on her starboard side.
At first it didn't look like much. The Taiho kept steaming and kept launching planes. But the hit had cracked her aviation fuel tanks, and gasoline fumes began spreading through the ship. Her damage-control officer made a fatal call. He opened up the ventilation to clear the fumes, and it spread them through the whole hangar instead.
Around noon, a second submarine, the Cavalla, found the carrier Shokaku. The Shokaku was one of the six carriers that had attacked Pearl Harbor. Cavalla fired six torpedoes and three of them hit. Fires reached her fuel and her ammunition, and the Shokaku blew up and sank. More than twelve hundred men died with her.
At about two-thirty in the afternoon, a spark set off the fumes inside the Taiho. The explosion tore through her. She burned and sank, and about sixteen hundred and fifty of her crew went down with her. Ozawa had to move his flag to a destroyer.
Both American submarines were hunted with depth charges afterward. The Albacore counted seventy-five. The Cavalla counted a hundred and six. Both of them made it home.
So by the night of the nineteenth of June, Japan had lost two of its biggest carriers and most of the planes it had sent to fight. And Ozawa still didn't fully know it. Many of his planes had flown on toward Guam, and he believed that hundreds of them were safe on the island. They weren't.
On the twentieth of June, Mitscher finally went after him.
Most of the day went by without contact. Then, at about three-forty in the afternoon, a search plane from the Enterprise found the Japanese fleet. It was about two hundred and seventy-five miles away, and later reports put it farther than that.
Mitscher had a terrible choice. Two hundred and seventy-five miles was at the very edge of his planes' range. It was late afternoon. If he launched now, his planes would reach the enemy around sunset, and then they would have to fly all the way back in the dark and land on carriers at night. Most of these pilots had never landed on a carrier at night.
He launched anyway. Two hundred and forty planes took off. Fourteen turned back. Two hundred and twenty-six went on: Hellcats, Avengers, Helldivers and Dauntlesses.
They found the Japanese just before the sun went down. Avengers from the light carrier Belleau Wood put bombs and torpedoes into the carrier Hiyo, and she sank. American planes also damaged the carrier Zuikaku, two light carriers, the battleship Haruna and the heavy cruiser Maya, and wrecked two oilers so badly that the Japanese had to scuttle them. Twenty American planes were shot down over the Japanese fleet.
Then came the hard part. The flight home.
It was dark now, and the planes were low on fuel. They had more than two hundred miles of open ocean to cross. Planes began to drop out of formation one by one and ditch in the sea. Pilots started counting their fuel in minutes.
The first of them reached the American fleet at about a quarter to nine at night. And there was nothing to see. Warships at night in wartime run blacked out. A lit-up carrier was a perfect target for any Japanese submarine in the area.
Rear Admiral Jocko Clark turned his ships' lights on first. Mitscher backed him. Then the order went out to the whole task force to turn on the lights.
Every ship lit up. Searchlights pointed straight up into the sky as beacons. Destroyers fired star shells to light the sea. It was the kind of thing no admiral did in wartime, and Mitscher did it because his men were out there.
It was chaos. Pilots landed on whatever deck they could find. Some crashed on the flight decks. Some ran out of fuel within sight of the ships and went into the water. About eighty planes were lost that night, most of them ditched in the sea, but the destroyers spent that night and the next days picking the crews out of the water, and most of the men were saved.
When it was all counted, the Navy's own figures said Japan lost three hundred and ninety-five carrier planes in two days. That was ninety-two percent of everything its carriers had brought. On top of that, about fifty more land-based planes were destroyed on Guam. Japan also lost three carriers, the Taiho, the Shokaku and the Hiyo.
The American losses were a hundred and thirty planes and seventy-six pilots and aircrewmen, and most of those planes were lost on the night flight home, not to the enemy.
So was Spruance right?
For years after the war, the aviators said no. If he had let Mitscher run west on the night of the eighteenth, they argued, Task Force Fifty-Eight could have caught Ozawa at dawn and sunk his whole fleet. Admiral John Towers, one of the Navy's senior aviators, even pushed to have Spruance relieved. Admiral Nimitz said no. Admiral King, the head of the whole Navy, backed Spruance.
Spruance's answer was simple. His job was the landing on Saipan, and the landing was never in danger. Saipan fell. And from the Marianas, the B twenty-nines started bombing Japan.
The Japanese fleet did escape that June. Six of Ozawa's carriers got away. But that didn't save them, because a carrier is only as good as its planes and pilots, and Japan had no pilots left.
Four months later, in October nineteen forty-four, at Leyte Gulf, Ozawa sailed with what was left of the Japanese carrier force. This time he had only about a hundred planes. His carriers weren't sent to fight. They were sent as bait, to lure the American carriers north while the battleships went for the landings. Zuikaku, the last surviving carrier from the Pearl Harbor attack, was sunk in that battle.
That was what the Turkey Shoot had really done. It didn't just destroy hundreds of planes. It ended Japan's carrier force as a fighting weapon. The carriers were still afloat. They just had nobody left to fly from them.
And it didn't come down to one superweapon. It came down to pilots who had trained for years, a room full of radar screens deep inside the ship, a tough airplane, two submarines in the right place, and one admiral willing to turn on the lights.