The 'Cargo Ship' American Carrier That Sank 13 Enemy Submarines
19 min read
June 23rd, 1944. 2340 hours. The central Atlantic, roughly 850 nautical miles west of the Cape Verde Islands. A single Grumman Avenger flies through the dark at low altitude. In the rear of the aircraft, radar operator Ed Whitlock watches a small green return on his scope. The contact is on the surface. It is large. It is exactly where naval intelligence said it would be.
The contact is I-52, a Japanese cargo submarine of 2,564 tons surfaced displacement, 356 feet long, one of the largest submarines in the world. She has sailed from Japan to France around the Cape of Good Hope. Inside her hull are 146 bars of gold packed in 49 metal boxes, more than 2 tons of it. There is tungsten, molybdenum, opium, and 14 passengers, most of them Japanese technicians on their way to study German weapons. The day before, she met a German U-boat in mid-ocean and took aboard a German radar detector, an Enigma machine, and a German liaison officer. She is 1 week from Lorient.
The Avenger that found her flew from a ship that was never supposed to be a warship at all. USS Bogue began life on a merchant slipway in Tacoma, Washington, as a cargo ship named Steel Advocate. She was slow. She was unarmored. Her flight deck was barely half the length of a fleet carrier's. Her crews had a name for ships like her: combustible, vulnerable, expendable. Two of the first escort carriers to go to war had already been destroyed, one by a single torpedo, one by her own aviation fuel.
Within the hour, I-52 was on the bottom, 17,000 feet down. Nobody aboard Bogue ever saw her. The kill was made by a torpedo the Navy officially called a mine, guided by sound, and confirmed by floating microphones listening in the dark.
I-52 was not Bogue's first submarine. She was her 11th. By the end of the war, Bogue and the warships that sailed with her were credited with 13 enemy submarines, more than any other escort carrier group in the United States Navy.
How did a converted cargo ship with one engine and 18 knots become the most lethal submarine hunter in the American fleet? The answer begins in the spring of 1943, when the Battle of the Atlantic was being lost.
In March 1943, German U-boats came closer to cutting the Atlantic lifeline than at any other point in the war. In the first 20 days of that month, wolf packs attacking convoys HX 229 and SC 122 sank 22 merchant ships. The losses were concentrated in one stretch of ocean, the mid-Atlantic air gap, the area south of Greenland beyond the reach of land-based aircraft from Newfoundland, Iceland, and Northern Ireland. Convoy sailors called it the black pit. Inside it, U-boats could run on the surface in daylight, shadow a convoy, call in the rest of the pack, and attack at night with no aircraft overhead to force them down.
Everything Britain needed to stay in the war crossed that gap. Fuel, food, ammunition, aircraft, and the American Army that would one day land in France. If the gap stayed open, the invasion of Europe could not be supplied.
The obvious answer was air cover over the convoys from start to finish. The Royal Navy had tried it. In 1941, the Admiralty converted a captured German merchant ship, the Hannover, into HMS Audacity, the first escort carrier. She carried six fighters on an open deck with no hangar. She proved that aircraft at sea could protect a convoy. She also proved how fragile such a ship was. On December 21st, 1941, U-751 put torpedoes into her and she sank.
The next generation fared no better. HMS Avenger, an American-built escort carrier on a merchant hull, was torpedoed by U-155 west of Gibraltar on November 15th, 1942. A single torpedo detonated her bomb room. She broke apart and sank within minutes. 12 men survived from a crew of more than 500. Four months later, on March 27th, 1943, HMS Dasher blew up in the Firth of Clyde during routine flying operations. An aviation fuel explosion tore through her hangar. She sank in about 8 minutes. 379 men died.
The lesson seemed plain. A merchant hull carrying aviation gasoline and bombs, with no armor and no real compartmentation, was a floating bomb. The ships were too slow to outrun a surfaced U-boat by much. Their decks were too short for heavy aircraft without perfect wind. Their aircraft complements were too small to sustain round-the-clock patrols. And the doctrine of the day kept them tied to the convoy, steaming in the middle of a slow formation as one more target.
Senior officers on both sides of the Atlantic questioned whether escort carriers were worth the steel. Fleet carriers were the real thing. Escort carriers were stopgaps, something built because real carriers took too long.
Bogue had all of those weaknesses. She was laid down on October 1st, 1941, as a Maritime Commission Type C3 cargo hull, launched January 15th, 1942, and taken over by the Navy before she was finished. She was commissioned on September 26th, 1942, under Captain Giles E. Short.
On paper, she was everything the critics described. 495 feet long overall. 8,390 tons standard displacement. One Allis-Chalmers geared steam turbine, two boilers, one shaft, 8,500 shaft horsepower, 18 knots flat out. A fleet carrier of the Essex class was 872 feet long, made 33 knots, and carried around 90 aircraft. Bogue carried between 19 and 24. Her defensive armament as built was two 5-inch guns and ten 20-millimeter cannon. She had no armor belt. Her magazines and gasoline stowage sat inside a hull designed to carry freight.
She cost $3,733,124.
By every measure that mattered to a fleet admiral, she was a second-rate ship. But the U-boat war was not a fleet action, and the measures that mattered were different.
To understand why Bogue succeeded, look at the problem from the German side. A U-boat in 1943 was a submersible, not a true submarine. Its endurance, speed, and ability to reach a convoy all depended on running on the surface. Submerged, a Type VII could make about 7 knots for a short time, then creep along at 2 or 3 knots to save its batteries. On the surface, it could make 17. A U-boat forced underwater lost contact with its convoy. A U-boat kept underwater all day could not recharge its batteries. And a U-boat that could not refuel at sea could not reach the distant hunting grounds off Brazil, West Africa, or the Indian Ocean at all.
That meant the most valuable thing an anti-submarine force could do was simple. Find U-boats on the surface and attack them before they dived. Aircraft could do that. Ships could not. A destroyer on the horizon at 10 miles was visible to a U-boat lookout long before it arrived. An aircraft at 1,500 feet covered that same distance in 2 or 3 minutes.
The second weakness of the U-boat arm was its own command system. Admiral Karl Dönitz ran the war from shore by radio. Boats reported their positions, their fuel, their sightings, and their weather. Headquarters assigned patrol lines, formed wolf packs, and arranged rendezvous with supply submarines. The system depended on a constant stream of high-frequency radio traffic.
The Allies were listening in two ways. The first was high-frequency direction finding, known to every sailor as Huff-Duff. Shore stations and, increasingly, escort ships carried receivers that could take a bearing on a U-boat's transmission within seconds. Two or more bearings crossed gave a position. The second was code breaking. When Allied cryptanalysts were reading the U-boat Enigma traffic, they knew where the patrol lines were, where the tankers would meet their customers, and sometimes which boat was coming home on which route.
On May 20th, 1943, Admiral Ernest King established the Tenth Fleet in Washington, a fleet with no ships. It was an anti-submarine command center that fused direction finding, decrypted signals, and operational reports into a single plot. Its job was to tell the hunters where to go.
What it needed were hunters that could stay at sea for weeks, carry their own aircraft, and go anywhere the plot pointed. That is exactly what a slow, cheap escort carrier could do.
Bogue's real weapon was not the ship. It was the system built around her. Her air group was a composite squadron, a mix of two aircraft types designed to work as a pair. The Grumman Wildcat fighter carried four or six .50-caliber machine guns. The Grumman Avenger torpedo bomber was the largest single-engine aircraft in American service, with an internal bomb bay that could carry depth bombs or a torpedo, a radar set, and a crew of three.
The tactic that came out of that pairing was precise. When a U-boat was sighted on the surface and chose to stay up and fight with its anti-aircraft guns, the Wildcat attacked first, diving in to strafe the conning tower and the gun platforms. The purpose was not to sink the submarine. The purpose was to kill or scatter the gun crews. The Avenger followed seconds behind, flying straight and level down the length of the boat to drop a stick of depth bombs set to explode at shallow depth beside the hull. One aircraft suppressed. The other killed.
The ship herself was modified to make that possible. A hydraulic catapult forward allowed fully loaded Avengers to launch even when Bogue could not generate enough wind over her short deck with her own speed. A hangar beneath the flight deck kept aircraft maintained in Atlantic weather. And the escorts that sailed with her were not tied to a convoy. They screened the carrier, then broke away to finish any U-boat the aircraft forced down.
Then there was the weapon nobody was allowed to name. The Mark 24 was an air-dropped acoustic homing torpedo, developed by Bell Labs and Harvard's Underwater Sound Laboratory. It weighed about 680 pounds, ran at about 12 knots, and steered itself toward the sound of a submarine's propellers. To protect the secret, the Navy designated it the Mark 24 mine. Aircrews called it Fido. They were ordered never to drop it when a surfaced U-boat could see it, and never when a surface ship might recover it. It was used only after a submarine had dived, at the moment when every earlier weapon had lost its target.
Finally, sonobuoys. Small floating radio receivers with hydrophones hanging beneath them, dropped from aircraft in patterns around the spot where a U-boat had dived. Each buoy transmitted what it heard back to the aircraft overhead. For the first time, an aircraft could keep listening to a submarine after it disappeared.
Put together, the pieces created something no navy had used before at scale. Intelligence pointed to an area of ocean. The carrier steamed there. Radar-equipped aircraft searched it. Fighters suppressed. Bombers attacked. Homing torpedoes finished boats that dived. Destroyers hunted what remained. A ship that could not fight anything else had become the center of a system built to do one thing.
The system's first test came in spring 1943. Bogue sailed in February as the nucleus of the first American hunter-killer group. Her first three Atlantic crossings, through March and April, produced no kills. The air group was learning. The doctrine was still tied too closely to the convoys. On the fourth crossing, that changed.
On May 21st, 1943, Bogue's Avengers caught U-231 on the surface and damaged her so badly that a chlorine gas leak from her flooded batteries forced her home to La Pallice. The next day, May 22nd, Avengers attacked U-569 with depth bombs. The boat was damaged and unable to dive safely. Her crew scuttled her and abandoned ship. The Canadian destroyer HMCS St. Laurent picked up 24 survivors. It was the first U-boat ever destroyed by an American escort carrier.
It came at the decisive moment. May 1943 was the month the Germans would call Black May. 41 U-boats were lost that month. On May 24th, 2 days after U-569 went down, Dönitz withdrew his boats from the North Atlantic convoy routes. The air gap was closing, and escort carriers were closing it.
The U-boats moved south, to the central Atlantic between the Azores and the Canaries, where they expected less air cover. That is exactly where the Tenth Fleet sent Bogue next.
On June 5th, 1943, Avengers from Bogue found U-217 on the surface near the Mid-Atlantic Ridge and attacked with depth bombs. She was lost with all hands.
On June 12th, they found U-118. She was a Type XB, the largest U-boat type Germany built, 294 feet long, designed as a minelayer and able to carry 66 mines. She was under the command of Korvettenkapitän Werner Czygan. The first two Avengers attacked west of the Canary Islands. Then Bogue sent more. Eight aircraft took turns strafing and bombing the submarine until she broke up and sank. The destroyer Osmond Ingram picked up 16 survivors.
On July 23rd, Bogue's aircraft sank U-527. The old four-stacker destroyer USS Clemson picked up 12 survivors. The same patrol, Bogue's screen destroyer USS George E. Badger, built in 1920, sank U-613 by depth charge. In 2 months, a converted cargo ship and a handful of destroyers older than most of their crews had removed five U-boats from the Atlantic.
The Germans changed tactics. Dönitz ordered U-boats to stay on the surface when attacked by aircraft and fight back with heavier flak. He added quadruple 20-millimeter mounts and 37-millimeter guns to the conning towers. For a few weeks, the order cost Allied aircrews heavily. But against a carrier group, it played straight into the Wildcat and Avenger team. A U-boat that stayed up to fight was exactly the target the Wildcat was there to suppress, and the Avenger was there to kill.
Bogue's eighth patrol, in late 1943, was her most productive. On November 29th, her aircraft sank U-86 at 39 degrees 33 minutes north, 19 degrees 1 minute west, east of the Azores. On November 30th, Avengers with rockets damaged U-238, killing two and wounding five.
Then came U-172. She was one of the most successful boats in the U-boat arm. Over six patrols, she had sunk 26 merchant ships totaling 152,080 gross registered tons. On December 12th, 1943, Bogue's aircraft found her west of the Canary Islands and forced her down. What followed was a 27-hour hunt. Aircraft circled the datum. Four old destroyers, George E. Badger, Clemson, Osmond Ingram, and Du Pont, crossed and recrossed the area, dropping as many as 200 depth charges. Every time U-172 tried to surface for air, she found aircraft overhead. On December 13th, she came up for the last time and was destroyed by gunfire and depth charges. 13 of her crew were killed. 46 survived.
One week later, on December 20th, Bogue's Avengers sank U-850, a long-range Type IXD2 heading for the Indian Ocean, with all hands. Four U-boats in 3 weeks.
The record earned Bogue the Presidential Unit Citation, the highest award a United States ship can receive as a unit. It went to a ship whose own crews had called her a target.
In 1944, the hunt widened. On March 13th, Bogue's Avengers combined with Royal Air Force Fortresses, the American destroyer escorts Haverfield and Hobson, and the Canadian frigate Prince Rupert to sink U-575 north of the Azores. On May 13th, the destroyer escort Francis M. Robinson, from Bogue's screen, sank RO-501, a German Type IXC boat that had been handed over to Japan and was carrying a Japanese crew to the Pacific.
Which brings us back to the night of June 23rd, 1944.
By then, Bogue was commanded by Captain Aurelius B. Vosseller, and her air group was Composite Squadron 69, with nine FM-2 Wildcats and 12 TBF-1C Avengers. Allied code breakers had followed I-52 since she left Japan. They knew her route. They knew about the rendezvous with U-530. They knew the gold was aboard. The Tenth Fleet sent Bogue to the meeting point.
Bogue did something few escort carriers attempted in 1944. She flew at night. Night carrier operations from a 440-foot deck in the open Atlantic required trained pilots, trained deck crews, and radar-equipped aircraft. VC-69 had all three.
At about 2340 hours, Lieutenant Commander Jesse D. Taylor's Avenger made radar contact. Taylor dropped flares and attacked with depth bombs. They missed. I-52 dived. Under the old rules, that would have been the end of it. A submerged submarine was invisible to an aircraft.
Taylor dropped a pattern of sonobuoys. He listened. The buoys picked up propeller noise. Taylor dropped a Mark 24 Fido into the water near the sound. The torpedo began its search, heard the propellers, and turned toward them. Minutes later, the sonobuoys transmitted an explosion. Then the sounds of a hull breaking up.
Taylor, low on fuel, returned to Bogue. A second Avenger, flown by Lieutenant junior grade William Gordon, with a civilian underwater sound expert named Price Fish aboard, took over. Around 0100 hours on June 24th, they heard faint propeller noise through the buoys and, on Captain Vosseller's order, dropped a second Fido. That noise was later traced to U-530, about 20 miles away, the sound carried through a layer in the ocean.
The next morning, the destroyer escort Janssen searched the area. She recovered raw rubber, bales of silk, and human remains. I-52 was gone. All aboard were lost, 95 Japanese crewmen, 14 passengers, and the three Germans who had joined her the day before.
For decades, the Navy credited both pilots. Later analysis of the original sonobuoy recordings at the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory concluded that Taylor's single torpedo sank I-52. One aircraft, one homing torpedo, one floating microphone, at night, against a target nobody aboard ever saw.
In 1995, a search team led by Paul Tidwell located the wreck at a depth of about 17,000 feet, within half a mile of their computed position and about 20 miles from where the Navy had placed her in 1944. The conning tower stood intact on the seabed. The gold remains aboard. Japan regards the site as a war grave.
Two months later, on August 20th, 1944, Bogue's aircraft sank U-1229. In April 1945, in the last weeks of the war, Captain George J. Dufek's Second Barrier Force, built around Bogue, faced the final group of U-boats sent toward the American coast. On April 24th, U-546 torpedoed the destroyer escort Frederick C. Davis. Bogue's escorts hunted U-546 down and sank her the same day.
That was 13. 11 German U-boats, one German boat with a Japanese crew, and one Japanese submarine carrying gold.
Measure what that number means. A U-boat cost Germany months of construction and a trained crew of around 50 men who took far longer to replace than the steel. A boat like U-172 had already sunk 26 ships. A boat like U-850 or I-52 was carrying the technology, raw materials, and payments that tied Germany and Japan together across the world. Every one of them removed from the sea was a convoy that arrived, a tanker that reached its port, a cargo of tungsten that never reached a German factory.
The cost of the carrier that did this was $3,733,124. She was one of 45 ships built to the Bogue design, 11 for the United States Navy and 34 for the Royal Navy, all on the same merchant hull. The conversion that critics called a stopgap became a production line. By the end of the war, American yards had built more than 100 escort carriers for the United States and its allies. The Casablanca class, built by Henry J. Kaiser's yards, was turned out at the rate of roughly one a week.
The doctrine Bogue pioneered spread across the Atlantic. Card, Core, Santee, Block Island, and Guadalcanal formed their own hunter-killer groups. On June 4th, 1944, USS Guadalcanal's group captured U-505 intact off West Africa. The escort carriers and their escorts closed the Atlantic to the U-boat on the surface, and a submarine that could not use the surface could no longer fight the convoy war Dönitz had planned.
And the same type of ship that the critics dismissed as combustible, vulnerable, and expendable went on to fight in the Pacific. At Samar on October 25th, 1944, six escort carriers of Taffy 3 and their screen held off the main body of the Imperial Japanese Navy.
The ideas outlived the ships. Hunter-killer groups built around carriers, intelligence-directed searches, air-dropped homing torpedoes, and sonobuoys formed the foundation of anti-submarine warfare through the Cold War. Every modern maritime patrol aircraft that drops a buoy pattern and then a homing torpedo is repeating, in more advanced form, what Jesse Taylor did over the central Atlantic on the night of June 23rd, 1944.
Bogue was placed in reserve at Tacoma, Washington, on November 30th, 1946, in the same city where she had been launched as a cargo ship. She was struck from the Navy list in 1959 and sold for scrap in 1960.
Return to that night in June 1944. A cargo ship hull 850 miles west of Africa, steaming at a speed a surfaced U-boat could almost match. An air group of 21 aircraft. A torpedo the Navy would not call a torpedo. A pattern of floating microphones. And somewhere below, the largest submarine Japan had sent into the Atlantic, carrying 2 tons of gold toward France.
The critics were right about everything they measured. Bogue was slow. She was unarmored. She was small. She was built from a freighter. And none of it mattered, because the war she was built for was not decided by speed, armor, or size. It was decided by finding the enemy, keeping aircraft over him, and having the right weapon when he dived. The Navy invested in intelligence, in aircrew training, in new weapons, and in a doctrine that set the carrier free to hunt. A $3.7 million ship turned that investment into 13 enemy submarines.
The Navy had built Bogue as a stopgap. She became the most successful submarine hunter of her kind in American history.