The 'Tin Can' American Destroyers That Knocked Out Hitler's Guns When Omaha Beach Was Failing

16 min read

By nine o'clock on the morning of June sixth, nineteen forty-four, the landing at Omaha Beach was failing. Most of the men who had crossed the sand were pinned against a bank of stones with the tide coming in behind them. Offshore, nine American destroyers were mostly holding their fire over the beach, as ordered. Before the morning was over those ships, the tin cans of Destroyer Squadron Eighteen, were working the shallows, some of them inside a thousand yards, knocking German guns out of the cliffs. By late afternoon, German soldiers were trying to surrender to one of them by signal lamp.

This account is built from the ships' own action reports and deck logs, and from the Army's official history of the beach. It covers why the plan collapsed, what each destroyer did, and what the generals said about it that night.

Nothing about these ships suggested they would matter that day.

Destroyer Squadron Eighteen was nine destroyers of the Gleaves class, all built by one yard, Seattle-Tacoma Shipbuilding, and commissioned between December nineteen forty-two and July nineteen forty-three. Each displaced sixteen hundred thirty tons and was three hundred forty-eight feet long and thirty-six feet across. Each carried four five-inch guns, and drew at most a little over seventeen feet of water. What armor they had was light plating around the bridge and the gun director. Sailors called destroyers tin cans, or just cans.

Their crews were mostly reservists. The squadron's historian, who was gunnery officer of USS Doyle that day, remembered sailors called up from Kansas, Illinois, North Carolina and the Bronx. Few had seen salt water before. The captains were about thirty-four years old, and not many others aboard were over thirty.

Their war so far had been convoy escort. They had crossed the Atlantic again and again to Casablanca and Northern Ireland, chasing sonar contacts and dropping depth charges, usually to no avail. The same officer called it dull duty.

In March nineteen forty-four they got a new commander. Captain Harry Sanders had led another destroyer squadron through the landings at Salerno and Anzio. In April the squadron sailed for England, and in May it practiced shore bombardment in Scotland with the fire control parties, small teams of Army and Navy men who were supposed to land with the infantry and call down the ships' fire by radio.

Eleven days before the invasion the squadron lost a ship. Running down the Irish Sea in the dark with a troop convoy, USS Endicott cut across the bow of a freighter and lost her own bow. USS Emmons took her place and her secret orders. So the nine American destroyers at Omaha were eight ships of Squadron Eighteen plus Emmons. Three British destroyers of the Hunt class, Melbreak, Talybont and Tanatside, made twelve.

The beach they were sent to was built to stop exactly this kind of landing. Omaha was about sixty-five hundred yards of sand under bluffs that rise a hundred to a hundred seventy feet. Vehicles could leave it only through five gaps in the bluffs, called draws, and the Germans had built their defense around those gaps. The Army's history counts twelve strongpoints able to fire directly on the beach. Between them they held more than sixty light artillery pieces. There were eight concrete casemates for guns of seventy-five to eighty-eight millimeters, thirty-five pillboxes, and about eighteen antitank guns. Another count adds no fewer than eighty-five machine-gun nests.

The heavier guns did not point out to sea. They pointed along the beach, to take landing craft and men from the side. Thick concrete wing-walls hid their flash, and in the Army's words made them hard to spot from the sea.

The plan was to bury all of this before the first soldier arrived. From ten to six until twenty-five past six, the battleships Texas and Arkansas, a group of British and French cruisers and the twelve destroyers fired about three thousand rounds at targets picked from air photographs. While they fired, three hundred twenty-nine B twenty-four bombers dropped more than thirteen thousand bombs. Then landing craft fired salvos of rockets, and swimming Sherman tanks were to crawl out of the surf just ahead of the infantry.

Almost none of it worked. Cloud covered the coast, so the bombers aimed by instrument and held their bombs up to thirty seconds longer to be sure of missing the landing craft. Not one bomb was reported on the beach. The naval fire left the beach guns largely intact. And of the thirty-two swimming tanks sent toward the eastern half of the beach, five reached the sand.

At half past six the first infantry landed, and over the beach the guns of the fleet fell almost silent.

That silence was an order. Once troops were ashore, the ships were not to fire unless a target was exceptionally definite, until they had contact with their fire control parties on the beach. But those parties were landing into the same fire as everyone else. Three-quarters of the radios of the Hundred Sixteenth Infantry were destroyed. About eight o'clock, one party that had reached its ships was told by a general on the beach that it was unwise to designate a target.

So for most of the first two hours, the destroyer crews watched the beach and held their fire over it, as ordered. Company A of the Hundred Sixteenth Infantry landed in front of the Vierville draw and was out of action in fifteen minutes. Two large landing craft were hit and burned for hours. At twenty to eight, USS Baldwin logged that she had checked fire, and that her repair parties used the lull to clear empty powder cases and hand out rations.

By half past eight the Navy beachmaster had stopped all landings of vehicles, because there was nowhere left to put them. By nine the tide was climbing more than an inch a minute, and wounded men at the water's edge were drowning in it.

The first destroyer to break the silence over the beach was USS Carmick. Before dawn her captain, Commander Robert Beer, had told his crew over the loudspeaker that this was probably going to be the biggest party they would ever go to, so they should all get out on the floor and dance.

About half past eight, Carmick sighted a group of American tanks struggling along the breakwater road toward the Vierville draw. The tanks were firing at one spot on the bluff above them. Carmick put several salvos into the same spot. When the tanks shifted their fire along the bluff, Carmick followed. Her action report calls it a silent cooperation. No radio was involved. The ship used the tanks' shell bursts as her point of aim.

Then, about nine o'clock, Captain Sanders arrived off the beach in his flagship, USS Frankford, coming in from the screen beyond the transports. According to the Navy's historian Samuel Eliot Morison, he ordered every destroyer to close in on the beach as far as possible and support the assault troops.

At ten to ten the admiral commanding the bombardment group, Carleton Bryant in Texas, came up on the voice radio for every ship to hear. Get on them, men, get on them. We must knock out those guns. They are raising hell with the men on the beach, and we can't have any more of that. We must stop it.

By then the three British destroyers had gone. They left for the screen on schedule, at half past seven, ten to nine and half past nine, as their orders required. Earlier they had fired in the opening bombardment, and Talybont had helped the Rangers at Pointe du Hoc. The close-in work that followed was done by the nine American destroyers.

Closing in on that beach was not a simple order to carry out. A destroyer that could draw seventeen feet had to work in toward a shelving shore, through water crowded with drifting landing craft, wreckage and mines. Doyle's report says the boats of the second wave were milling around her, constantly threatening collision. A current ran along the beach, which she measured at two point eight knots, and she had to hold herself in place against it with her engines.

At that range a five-inch gun shoots almost flat. The shell weighs fifty-five pounds and reaches a target a thousand yards away in a little over a second. Each gun could fire fifteen or more rounds a minute. The hard part was knowing what to shoot. Doyle's report admits that even at short range, her officers could not spot the guns, so they picked out spots that seemed to be machine-gun positions, made as sure as they could that no Americans were near, and fired.

USS McCook worked the western end. Even before the order, at eight thirty-nine, she opened on a pillbox that was firing on the beach, and by two minutes to nine her report read, pillbox demolished by direct hits. At nine thirty-three she found two guns set into the cliff, firing down the length of the beach. Thirteen minutes later, by her report, one gun emplacement had plunged from the cliff and the other had flown into the air. Then she moved in to thirteen hundred yards off Vierville and kept shooting.

Frankford took the middle. Her action report puts her about twelve hundred yards off the beach. Her gunnery officer, Owen Keeler, remembered her much nearer than that. In his later account, her captain, Commander James Semmes, took her in by depth sounder until the optical rangefinder was against its stops, at three to four hundred yards. That is one officer's recollection, and none of the reports confirms the figure. But a combat engineer on the beach, Sergeant James Knight, also remembered a destroyer coming into the shallows behind him and firing over his head.

Keeler remembered a tank, too. It sat at the water's edge and fired at something on the hill. Frankford followed with a five-inch salvo. The tank's gunner opened his hatch, looked back at the ship, waved, dropped inside and fired at another target.

Her report for ten thirty-six is drier. Troops on that stretch of beach were held up by a mortar battery on the ridge. Frankford located it and opened direct fire. The fifth salvo was a direct hit. There was a large cloud of green smoke, the mortars stopped, the troops advanced, and a number of Germans were seen to surrender. Nine minutes later she took on two machine-gun nests covering the road inland, and by three minutes to eleven they were silent.

Doyle went to the eastern end. At eleven she stopped eight hundred yards off the beach, the shortest range written down in any of the reports the squadron's history quotes. A machine-gun emplacement on the hillside was firing along the sand, and above it sat a concrete casemate. Her gunnery officer used the two forward guns, one shot at a time. The emplacement went first. Then a shell hit the face of the casemate just below its firing slit and chipped the concrete. The next went through the slit and burst in the gun room. Doyle's report notes, Army troops begin slow advance uphill from beach.

USS Harding demolished a pillbox that was holding up the draw toward Colleville. USS Thompson silenced a battery of rocket launchers with thirty rounds, then began knocking down the fortified houses around the Vierville exit. Emmons and Baldwin fought the batteries around the little harbor of Port-en-Bessin, on the eastern flank.

The Germans shot back, and Baldwin took the only hits the squadron's history records. At twenty past eight two shells struck her in quick succession. One hit a whaleboat. The other blew a hole eight inches by twelve in her forward deck and cut a hydraulic line to a gun. Nobody was hurt. Baldwin turned her after guns on the battery, and it stopped firing.

A few miles to the west, out of sight of the main beach, USS Satterlee had the Rangers at Pointe du Hoc. They landed forty minutes late, and by then the Germans were back on the clifftop with machine guns and grenades. The destroyer division's commander ordered Satterlee to move in on the point and take the cliff tops under fire. The Rangers got up. Later they called for fire by signal lamp. His report says the ships' fire repelled several counterattacks which otherwise would have wiped out the battalion.

Back on the main beach, things began to move. Vierville was taken about eleven. Around half past eleven, infantry attacking the last pillbox at the central draw got a fire control party in touch with a destroyer. The Army's history says her guns, firing only a few yards over the crowded beach, were on the target at about the fourth round, and the pillbox surrendered. That draw became the main road off Omaha. Within half an hour engineers were clearing its mines, and bulldozers were at work on the slope.

Even the battleship came in. At twelve twenty-three, Texas moved in to three thousand yards and put her guns on the Vierville exit.

Aboard the cruiser Augusta, General Omar Bradley's communications with the beach were, in his words, thin to nonexistent. He wrote later that he had privately considered evacuating the beachhead and sending the follow-up troops to other beaches. At half past one he got a message from the corps commander, General Leonard Gerow. Troops formerly pinned down on the beaches were advancing up the heights behind them. Bradley gave up any thought of abandoning Omaha.

The afternoon was slower. The ships had been sparing the church steeples, but the Germans were using them. When a shore party reported that the steeple at Vierville was an artillery observation post, Harding asked permission to fire. At thirteen past two she put forty rounds into it from thirty-two hundred yards. Her report says every shell landed in the target.

At four thirty-five, McCook fired four salvos into positions in the cliff. German soldiers came out showing a white flag and began signaling the ship, by flashing light and by semaphore. They were trying to surrender to a destroyer. McCook ordered them to march east and give themselves up.

As the shooting eased, the destroyers became aid stations. An Army amphibious truck brought twelve wounded men alongside Doyle. A landing craft brought twenty-four survivors of two wrecked landing ships. Doyle's doctor was a pediatrician. He operated on the wardroom table, helped by Army medics who had come aboard as survivors, and the wounded spent the night in the officers' bunks.

By midnight Doyle had fired seven hundred fourteen rounds of five-inch. Carmick had run out of ammunition and withdrawn to the screen.

That evening General Gerow went ashore to set up his headquarters. His first message to Bradley was one line. Thank God for the United States Navy.

Bradley put it his own way years later. As on Sicily, the Navy saved our hides. Twelve destroyers moved in close to the beach, heedless of shallow water, mines, enemy fire and other obstacles. The main batteries of these gallant ships became our sole artillery. He counted twelve, though by the time the ships went in close the three British destroyers had left for the screen.

The chief of staff of the First Division inspected the German positions afterward and wrote to the Navy that they should have been impregnable. He was now firmly convinced, he said, that the supporting naval fire got the division in, and that without that gunfire they positively could not have crossed the beaches.

Those are strong words, and the story needs two corrections that most retellings leave out.

First, the destroyers did not win Omaha alone. Even their own historian wrote that they backed up the heroic efforts of the soldiers. By nine o'clock, before Sanders gave his order, small groups of infantry had already climbed the bluffs between the draws, where the defenses were thin. Colonel George Taylor had come ashore and told his men that two kinds of people were staying on that beach, the dead and those who were going to die. The Army's history is clear that the assault troops did not stay pinned down. What they could not do with rifles was open the draws, and until the draws were open the tanks and vehicles were hemmed in on the beach. The destroyers helped break the strongpoints that held those exits shut. Their historian's own phrase is that the naval guns were instrumental in turning the tide.

Second, nobody defied orders, and the story of a destroyer run aground on purpose has no support in the squadron's history. Carmick's early shooting was at a clearly seen target, which the standing order allowed. After that a captain ordered the ships in, and an admiral repeated it. That history, drawing on Morison, says the destroyers risked grounding and shell fire, and it goes no further. No Allied destroyer was lost off Omaha. The nearest thing came the next afternoon, when Harding struck an unmarked obstruction and damaged both propellers.

The cost ashore, by the Army's corrected count, was about three thousand killed, wounded and missing. Aboard the destroyers, Baldwin's two hits hurt no one.

There was no reward to match. Thirty-six Navy Unit Commendations went to destroyers and destroyer escorts in the war. None was for Normandy. Neither was any of the twenty-one Presidential Unit Citations. The officers got a few Bronze Stars and letters of commendation. The gunnery officers waited almost a year for theirs.

Six days after the landing, Thompson carried Eisenhower, Marshall, King and Hap Arnold across the Channel to see Omaha for themselves. By the end of nineteen forty-four the squadron had been scattered. Harding and Emmons were already being rebuilt as fast minesweepers for the Pacific, and four more of the squadron's ships followed in nineteen forty-five. On April sixth, nineteen forty-five, off Okinawa, five kamikazes hit Emmons in one afternoon, and she was scuttled the next day. Frankford lasted until nineteen seventy-three, when the Navy sank her as a target off Puerto Rico.

The story might have stayed in the action reports. But in nineteen eighty-nine Sergeant Knight, the engineer who had watched a destroyer come in behind him, wrote an article asking someone to find out whether that one ship had turned the tide. Doyle's old gunnery officer, William Kirkland, took up the question. His answer was that Frankford was not alone, and he named the others.

Knight also wrote to Frankford's crew. Without the damage you inflicted on the German emplacements, he told them, the only way any G I was going to leave Omaha was in a mattress cover or as a prisoner of war.

Ten years after D-Day, the admiral who commanded the American naval force told the historian Samuel Eliot Morison what his greatest asset had been. Courage there was in plenty, he said. But it was the resourcefulness of young sailors, coxswains and junior boat officers, and of the skippers and gunnery officers of the cans, that made courage and training count.

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