The 'Hunted' American Submarine That Sank Three Japanese Destroyers In Four Days

18 min read

On the night of June sixth, nineteen forty-four, while Allied soldiers were fighting their way off the beaches of Normandy, an American submarine was running on the surface through a narrow strait off the coast of Borneo. She was chasing a convoy of Japanese tankers under a bright moon. One of the escorts saw her. A Japanese destroyer swung out of line and came straight for the submarine at full speed.

Every submarine captain in the Pacific knew what to do next, because there was only one thing to do. A destroyer is the ship built to kill submarines. On the surface it is faster than a submarine. Against a submerged one it is nearly four times as fast. It has sonar to find the boat and depth charges to break it open. When a destroyer comes for you, you go deep, you go quiet, and you wait for it to lose interest.

Commander Sam Dealey did not go deep. He took U S S Harder down only as far as periscope depth, turned her stern toward the destroyer, and waited while it came on. At eleven hundred yards he fired three torpedoes. Two of them hit. The destroyer Minazuki sank in less than five minutes.

Over the next three days, in the same waters, Harder did it twice more. Three Japanese destroyers in four days, and a fourth earlier that spring, all of it on the doorstep of the anchorage where Japan had gathered its main battle fleet. The United States Navy's own history says those attacks helped push that fleet out to sea a day ahead of schedule, on its way to the worst carrier defeat Japan ever suffered.

Eleven weeks later, off the Philippines, Harder turned toward a charging escort one more time.

This account is built from Dealey's own reports, from the Japanese records of the ships he sank, from the Navy's report on the loss of Harder, and from the survey that found her in twenty twenty-four, sitting upright on the seabed. It begins with a boat that spent her first year learning exactly why submarines run from destroyers.

Samuel David Dealey was born in Dallas, Texas, in nineteen oh six. His uncle published the Dallas Morning News, and Dealey Plaza is named for that uncle. He graduated from the Naval Academy in nineteen thirty and went to sea as an ensign in the battleship Nevada. He moved to submarines in nineteen thirty-four and served in a string of old boats. Then he spent nearly two years as executive officer of the destroyer Reuben James, the ship a U-boat would sink six months after he left her.

When Japan attacked Pearl Harbor, Dealey was thirty-five years old and commanding S-twenty, an elderly submarine used for experiments off New London, Connecticut. He had never made a war patrol. The Navy gave him a new submarine anyway.

Her keel had been laid at the Electric Boat yard in Groton on December first, nineteen forty-one, six days before the attack. She was commissioned as U S S Harder a year and a day later. The harder is a fish, a kind of mullet. Her crew read the name differently. Their slogan was Hit 'em Harder.

Harder was a Gato class fleet submarine, the type that carried much of the American submarine war. She was three hundred and eleven feet long and displaced about fifteen hundred tons on the surface. She had six torpedo tubes in the bow and four in the stern, with twenty-four torpedoes aboard. Four diesel engines gave her twenty-one knots on the surface, enough to run around a convoy at night and get ahead of it. Underwater she ran on batteries. Flat out she could make nine knots submerged, and not for long. At two knots, a slow walk, the batteries lasted forty-eight hours. Her test depth was three hundred feet.

Those numbers describe an ambush weapon, a surface ship that can hide. They do not describe something that can outrun a destroyer or outfight one.

Her first year proved it. On the way to the Pacific, an American patrol plane machine-gunned and bombed her in the Caribbean while she was flashing the correct recognition signal. On her first war patrol, off Japan in June nineteen forty-three, an escort drove her down so hard during her first attack that she plowed into the muddy bottom and had to back herself out. On her second patrol, Japanese escorts held her down with depth charges for more than two days and came close to exhausting her batteries.

And all the while her engines were failing. Harder was one of twelve Gato boats built with diesels from Hooven, Owens, Rentschler, a licensed German design that the submarine force came to hate. She came home from her first patrol with one of the four completely broken down. On the third patrol one failed again, and the engineers kept the other three alive by stripping it for parts. After that the Navy sent her to Mare Island, in California, and replaced all four with General Motors diesels.

In spite of all that, Dealey was sinking ships. Postwar records credit Harder with nine Japanese ships on those first three patrols, and he came home from each one with a Navy Cross. But he had done it the standard way. He hit the merchant ships, and then he took whatever the escorts handed out.

Here is what the escorts had. A Japanese fleet destroyer of nineteen forty-four displaced about two thousand tons and made thirty-five knots. She carried sonar. She carried depth charges by the dozen. And she was so narrow, and turned so quickly, that she was a poor torpedo target even when a submarine wanted to shoot at her.

American torpedoes had made it worse. For most of the first two years of the war the Mark fourteen torpedo ran too deep and its exploders failed, which is a story of its own. By the spring of nineteen forty-four those faults had been fixed. A torpedo that hit would now go off.

That left geometry. A submarine normally wants a target crossing in front of it, showing its full length. A destroyer charging at you shows you only its bow, a target about thirty-five feet wide. But submariners had noticed something. If you fire a spread of torpedoes straight down that bow, the destroyer captain has three choices. He can hold his course and run onto them. He can turn left, or he can turn right, and either turn swings the length of his ship across the spread. They called it the down the throat shot.

It had been tried. In January nineteen forty-three, Mush Morton in U S S Wahoo used it on a destroyer at Wewak, as a last resort, and it worked. Nobody treated it as a method, and the reason is the cost of a miss. At thirty knots a destroyer covers a thousand yards a minute. A captain who fires at a thousand yards, and misses, has about one minute to get from periscope depth to somewhere safer. And the destroyer arriving overhead now knows exactly where he is.

On paper, a submarine that turns toward a destroyer is betting the boat and everyone in it on a single salvo. Dealey was about to make that bet a habit.

Harder left Pearl Harbor on her fourth patrol on March sixteenth, nineteen forty-four, with her new engines. Her first job was lifeguard duty, standing by to pick up airmen shot down during carrier strikes on the western Caroline Islands.

On April first she was told that an injured Navy fighter pilot, Ensign John Galvin, was stranded on the beach of a small Japanese-held island near Woleai. Dealey ran Harder's bow up against the reef and held her there with both propellers. His third officer, Lieutenant Sam Logan, and two volunteers went over the side with a rubber raft on a line and fought through the surf to the beach. A floatplane that landed to help ran over the line and cut it. Another crewman swam a new line in. With Japanese snipers firing from the trees and Navy planes circling overhead, the crew hauled the raft and the pilot back out by hand.

Twelve days later a Japanese plane spotted Harder north of the western Carolines and called in a destroyer. This was Ikazuchi. Two years earlier, under another captain, she had stopped in the Java Sea and pulled about four hundred British sailors out of the water. Now she came hunting.

Dealey let her come. He held his fire until she was nine hundred yards away, and then he fired four torpedoes. Ikazuchi sank in five minutes. As she went down, her own depth charges exploded among her crew, and Japanese records list no survivors.

Dealey's report of the action became famous in the submarine force. It said that he had expended four torpedoes and one destroyer.

Harder ended that patrol at Fremantle, in Western Australia, and her next orders came in two parts.

The first part was a place. In the middle of May, Japan had gathered its Mobile Fleet at Tawi Tawi, an island group at the southwest tip of the Philippines, just off Borneo. Nine aircraft carriers were there, along with the super battleships Yamato and Musashi, waiting for the decisive battle Japan meant to fight when the Americans made their next move. Tawi Tawi was close to the Borneo oil fields. It was also an open anchorage with no airfield, so the carriers had to put to sea to train their new pilots, and American submarines were waiting outside. Harder was to join them and watch the fleet.

The second part was a rescue. Six British and Australian intelligence men had been operating behind Japanese lines in northeast Borneo for months. Three submarines had already tried to bring them out and failed. Harder would carry an Australian major, William Jinkins, a sergeant named Stanley Dodds, two folding canoes and three Army walkie-talkies, and try again. The only way to the rendezvous was through Sibutu Passage, the strait between Borneo and Tawi Tawi. The Japanese fleet lay about forty miles east of it.

That is where Harder was on the night of June sixth, chasing three tankers and two destroyers in the moonlight. The destroyer that turned on her was Minazuki, a veteran from the nineteen twenties, escorting a tanker bound for the oil port of Balikpapan. Three torpedoes at eleven hundred yards, two hits. Another Japanese destroyer later picked up forty-five survivors.

Dealey went after the convoy. The second destroyer found him first. He fired all six bow tubes at her from twelve hundred yards, and every one of them missed. In the scramble that followed, Harder plunged out of control to four hundred feet, a hundred feet below her test depth, before her crew caught her. The convoy got away. The legend usually leaves that part out, and it shows what the shot cost when it failed.

The next morning a Japanese plane spotted her again, and at eleven forty-three another destroyer came looking. Hayanami was no relic. She had been in service for less than a year, and she was the flagship of a destroyer division. Dealey waited until she was six hundred and fifty yards away, about six times the length of his own boat. He fired three torpedoes. They hit amidships, a magazine went up, and the Navy's report says she sank tail first, within about a minute, almost on top of Harder. Two hundred and eight men died in her, including the captain commanding the division. Forty-five were rescued.

By that evening the area was full of destroyers and night-flying aircraft. Dealey later had to explain why he reached his rendezvous two days late. The delay, he wrote, was caused by sinking two destroyers, and by, in his words, a thorough arousing of the hostile nature of six more.

On the night of June eighth he kept the appointment. Harder surfaced after dark with her decks awash and crept toward the Borneo coast on her batteries, until she had six feet of water under her keel. The moon was full. Dealey wrote that visibility was like daytime. At twenty to ten, Jinkins and Dodds paddled away toward a shore more than three miles off.

Harder's executive officer, Lieutenant Commander Frank Lynch, had solved one problem in advance. The submarine's radar could not see a canoe beyond a thousand yards, so he had a square of wire mesh mounted on an oar. With a man holding it up, the radar tracked the canoes for about three miles, and the bridge steered them in by walkie-talkie.

A hundred yards off the mangroves, Jinkins called into the dark. Who are you? A voice answered with one word. Gort. It was the British major who led the party. The six men could not walk through the mud, so they crawled out to the canoes. By twenty-five past one in the morning they were aboard Harder, where the crew gave them a hot shower and a supper cooked for the occasion. Dealey noted that all six were slightly starved and in need of much rest. He added that he doubted the events that followed aboard Harder provided it.

They did not. On the evening of June ninth, coming back through the narrowest part of Sibutu Passage, a few miles from the fleet anchorage, Dealey found two destroyers patrolling together. This time nobody had seen him. He closed submerged to a thousand yards, waited for the two ships to overlap in his periscope, and fired four torpedoes.

His report describes what happened next. The first torpedo passed ahead. Number two struck the near destroyer close to the bow. Number three hit just under her bridge. About thirty seconds later a boiler exploded in the wreck, and Harder, four hundred yards away, was heeled over by the blast. Then he saw a blinding explosion on the second ship, and her stern standing straight up in the air. He ended the entry this way. The above listed pandemonium may not be in exact chronological order, but is as accurate as the happenings over that eventful few minutes can be remembered.

The first destroyer was Tanikaze. She had escorted the carriers to Pearl Harbor, survived Midway, and helped sink the American cruiser Helena. A hundred and fourteen of her crew died, and her captain died of his wounds two days later. The second destroyer is another matter. Dealey was certain he had sunk her. Japanese records show that she survived and helped pick up Tanikaze's men. What he saw through the periscope was most likely Tanikaze tearing herself apart.

The next afternoon, June tenth, Harder was south of Tawi Tawi when a formation came out of the anchorage. Dealey counted three battleships, four cruisers and their destroyers. Japanese records identify the heart of it. It was Yamato and Musashi, the two largest battleships ever built, leaving with their escorts for an operation off New Guinea.

A plane spotted the periscope. A destroyer peeled off and came in at thirty-five knots. Dealey turned Harder's bow toward her, fired three torpedoes down the throat at fifteen hundred yards, and went deep. Within a minute, explosions shook the boat worse than any depth charge had, as she passed eighty feet beneath the destroyer. Dealey believed he had killed another one. The Japanese records say that this destroyer dodged.

Those records hold one more detail. As the force left the anchorage, a lookout reported a periscope, possibly Harder's, and every ship put her rudder hard over. Musashi turned late and came up fast on Yamato's stern. Yamato's captain took the helm himself, and the two super battleships missed each other.

Harder took two hours of depth charges and aircraft bombs. The next day she went back and looked into the anchorage again, counted the cruisers and destroyers still there, and that night radioed what she had seen.

When Harder reached Darwin, the submarine force credited her with five destroyers in four days. Dealey's Medal of Honor citation still says five. The Japanese records, read after the war, support three, Minazuki, Hayanami and Tanikaze. The Navy's own historians now say the citation's count is inaccurate, and that what it says about the valor of the crew is not.

Three is enough. Counting Ikazuchi in April, Harder had sunk four fleet destroyers in eight weeks, and three of the four had been hunting her when she did it.

The effect went beyond the count. Japan was short of destroyers, and here they were being lost within sight of the fleet's own anchorage. The Navy's official history of Harder says that her attacks, and the stream of sighting reports that followed her around, convinced Admiral Toyoda, commanding the Combined Fleet, that Tawi Tawi was ringed with submarines. It says the Mobile Fleet sailed a day ahead of schedule as a result, and that the early start upset the Japanese plan. Historians argue about how much weight that carries, because the American landing on Saipan was going to bring that fleet out no matter what. The rest is not in dispute. The fleet left Tawi Tawi on June thirteenth with carrier pilots whose training had been cut short, because their ships could not safely leave the anchorage. American submarines reported it leaving. A week later, in the Philippine Sea, Japan lost three aircraft carriers and most of its carrier aircraft.

General MacArthur awarded Dealey the Army's Distinguished Service Cross. The admiral commanding submarines at Fremantle, Ralph Christie, rode along on Harder's next short run to see the boat for himself.

Then Christie took Dealey aside. Five patrols was enough, he said. It was time to hand Harder over to his executive officer, Frank Lynch. Dealey asked for one more. About a third of his crew was being replaced under the Navy's rotation policy, and he wanted to break in the new men himself. Lynch thought his captain was worn out. Christie let him go.

Harder left Fremantle on August fifth, leading a wolf pack with the submarines Hake and Haddo. Haddo's captain was Chester Nimitz Junior, the son of the admiral. On August twenty-second, off Bataan, Harder and Haddo caught three Japanese escort ships and sank all three. Two of them went to Harder. The next morning Haddo blew the bow off an old destroyer with her last torpedoes and headed home.

Dealey and Hake waited off Dasol Bay, on the west coast of Luzon, expecting the cripple to be there. At dawn on August twenty-fourth two ships came out. One was a patrol boat with three funnels, and she turned back into the bay. She was, of all things, a captured American destroyer, the old U S S Stewart, raised by the Japanese and put to work. The other was a small escort, Coast Defense Vessel Number Twenty-Two, and she kept coming, pinging with her sonar.

Hake's captain did not like the setup and broke away. At thirteen minutes to seven he saw Harder's periscope, six or seven hundred yards dead ahead. Nobody saw her again.

The Japanese record tells the rest. Harder fired three torpedoes down the throat at the escort. Two passed down her port side and one down her starboard side. The escort picked up the submarine on sonar, and at seven twenty-eight she began dropping depth charges, each pattern set deeper than the one before. Hake, slipping away, heard fifteen explosions. After the fifth attack, the Japanese crew watched oil, wood chips and cork come to the surface.

Seventy-nine men were aboard. Sam Logan, who went over the side at Woleai for a stranded pilot, was her executive officer by then. Torpedoman Vincent Dallessandro had helped assemble the canoes on deck off Borneo. Frank Lynch, who thought his captain needed a rest, had left the boat before she sailed.

Dealey's Medal of Honor was held up for months, by an argument among admirals over whether MacArthur's decoration already covered it. It was presented to his widow on August twenty-ninth, nineteen forty-five. In nineteen fifty-three the Navy named a new class of warship for him. U S S Dealey was a destroyer escort, a ship designed to hunt submarines.

In May twenty twenty-four, a team called the Lost Fifty-Two Project, which searches for the fifty-two American submarines lost in the war, found Harder off Luzon in more than three thousand feet of water. The Navy confirmed the identification. She sits upright on her keel, intact except for depth charge damage just behind the conning tower. The Navy's director of history, Samuel Cox, put it this way. Harder was lost in the course of victory. We must not forget that victory has a price, as does freedom.

The rule that Dealey broke was a good rule. Harder herself is the proof. She was driven into the mud on her first patrol, held down for two days on her second, and killed by a small escort on her sixth.

And the shot that made her famous was never a sure thing. Six times, Dealey fired at a warship that was coming for him. Three times the ship sank. Three times the torpedoes missed, and the third miss was the last thing Harder ever did.

What Dealey understood was narrower than the legend, and more useful. A destroyer captain charging a periscope expects the submarine to run. For the minute it takes him to cross the last thousand yards, he is steering down a line the submarine can predict exactly. That minute was the only time in the whole encounter when the submarine held the advantage, and almost nobody else was willing to stay at periscope depth long enough to use it.

Harder was hunted from her first patrol to her last morning. But for four days in June nineteen forty-four, forty miles from Japan's main fleet, the destroyers that went looking for one American submarine were the ships that did not come home.

Sam Dealey's report on the first of them still covers it. Four torpedoes expended, and one destroyer.

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