The 'Tin Can' American Destroyer That Charged Battleships With Her Last Three Torpedoes

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A few minutes before eight on the morning of October twenty-fifth, nineteen forty-four, an American destroyer east of the Philippine island of Samar found a Japanese battleship sharp on her port bow. It was already shooting at her. Behind it, by her own report, were three more.

The destroyer was U S S Heermann. She was a twenty-one hundred ton ship built of thin steel. American sailors called ships like her tin cans. Her five guns fired a fifty-four pound shell. She had already fired seven of her ten torpedoes at a cruiser, two of them by mistake. One of the battleships in front of her was Yamato, and a single one of Yamato's gun turrets weighed about as much as Heermann did.

Heermann turned toward them. From forty-four hundred yards, about two and a half miles, she fired her last three torpedoes at the leading battleship.

None of them hit. What they did instead is in the record of Yamato's movements, compiled from Japanese sources. They ran on past their target toward Yamato, and Yamato turned away from them and steamed north for about ten minutes, with the admiral commanding the Japanese fleet on board. An hour later Heermann was fighting heavy cruisers, with so much water in her bow that her anchors were dragging in the sea. Three American destroyers went into that fight. She was the only one that came home.

This account is built from the action report her captain signed a week later, from the Navy's own history of the ship, and from the Japanese ships' records of that morning. They do not agree on everything, including who should get the credit for turning Yamato, and where they disagree you will hear both sides. It starts with how a tin can came to be one of the few warships between that fleet, and General MacArthur's invasion.

Heermann was a Fletcher-class destroyer, one of a hundred and seventy-five the Navy commissioned between nineteen forty-two and nineteen forty-four. Bethlehem launched her at San Francisco in December nineteen forty-two, and she went into commission on July sixth, nineteen forty-three. Her name came from Lewis Heermann, a Navy surgeon. In eighteen oh four Stephen Decatur left him in charge of the ketch Intrepid in Tripoli harbor, while Decatur's men boarded the captured frigate Philadelphia and set her on fire.

A Fletcher was three hundred seventy-six feet long, with a crew of about three hundred and thirty, and she could make better than thirty-six knots. She paid for that speed in protection. Destroyers were nicknamed tin cans because they had almost no armor. Their plating was meant to stop splinters, not shells. What Heermann had was five single five-inch guns, aimed by radar through a fire control computer, and two mounts of five torpedo tubes on her centerline. The Japanese ships lacked that computer and the gunnery radar that fed it. Their gunners relied on optical rangefinders and mechanical calculators. Ten torpedoes was all she carried.

Set that beside Yamato. The Japanese flagship displaced nearly seventy-two thousand tons at full load, about as much as every ship in Heermann's task unit put together. She carried nine eighteen point one inch guns, the largest ever mounted in a warship. Each armor-piercing shell weighed thirty-two hundred pounds, about sixty times the weight of one of Heermann's.

No one planned for those two ships to meet. In October nineteen forty-four Heermann was a bodyguard. Her job was to screen escort carriers, the small, slow flattops whose planes flew air support for the troops going ashore on Leyte. Her unit was Task Unit seventy-seven point four point three, known by its radio call sign, Taffy Three. It had six escort carriers, three destroyers, Hoel, Heermann and Johnston, and four smaller destroyer escorts. Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague commanded it. Not one of his thirteen ships had a gun bigger than five inch. Heermann's captain was Commander Amos Hathaway, who had only recently been promoted to that rank.

The big ships were supposed to be somebody else's problem. Japan had sent nearly all of its remaining major warships to break up the Leyte landings, and the strongest piece was the Center Force under Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita. On October twenty-third, American submarines sank two of his heavy cruisers, one of them his own flagship. Kurita was pulled out of the water and moved his flag to Yamato. On the twenty-fourth, Admiral Halsey's carrier planes sank Yamato's sister ship Musashi, and Kurita was seen turning back.

Then Halsey took his carriers and his fast battleships north, after a Japanese carrier force that had been sent out as a decoy. San Bernardino Strait was left unguarded. Kurita had turned around again, and he came through it in the dark with four battleships, six heavy cruisers, two light cruisers and eleven destroyers. At dawn he was heading south along the coast of Samar toward Leyte Gulf, and Taffy Three was in his way.

At a quarter to seven, the men in Heermann's combat information center noticed that her surface search radar was being jammed. Ten minutes later her gunnery officer, who had the deck, saw large splashes rising near the carriers. He told the captain the formation might be under attack by high-level bombers. He had heard the contact report as fifty miles. It was fifteen. The crew went to general quarters just as Admiral Sprague came on the voice radio. His ships, he announced, were under fire from an enemy fleet.

The splashes were in color. The Japanese battleships loaded dye in their armor-piercing shells, a different color for each ship, so that spotters could tell their own fall of shot from the next ship's. Yamato used none, and her splashes came up white. She had opened fire at about seven o'clock from seventeen nautical miles. It was the only time in her career that she fired her main guns at enemy ships.

Sprague did the only things he could. He turned into the wind to launch every plane he had, and he ordered his escorts to lay smoke between the carriers and the enemy. His carriers could make about eighteen knots. The Japanese cruisers and destroyers could make thirty. Running would not be enough, so he ordered the screen to attack with torpedoes.

He had one thing working for him that he did not know about. The Japanese had taken his little escort carriers for six fleet carriers, and his destroyers for cruisers. The Japanese believed they had caught part of Halsey's main fleet. When an American destroyer came charging out of the smoke, Yamato's record logged her as a cruiser.

One destroyer had not waited. Commander Ernest Evans had already taken Johnston in alone, and one of her torpedoes blew the bow off the heavy cruiser Kumano. Heermann had farther to go. When the shooting began she was on the far side of the formation, the safer side, with the carriers between her and the Japanese.

To reach the enemy, she went through her own carriers at flank speed. Smoke and rain squalls kept changing what Hathaway could see. His report gives the visibility as anything from a hundred yards to twenty-five thousand. She backed her engines at emergency full to keep from running down the destroyer escort Samuel B. Roberts. Roberts was smaller and slower than a destroyer, and that morning her captain told his crew that they were going into battle against overwhelming odds, from which survival could not be expected. Then Heermann backed down again to miss Hoel. The order was to form column on Hoel, where the screen commander rode. Hathaway wrote that a true column was never formed.

At twenty-five past seven her radar had the enemy at thirty-five thousand yards. Her first target, when she got close enough, was a heavy cruiser. Hathaway ordered a half salvo, five torpedoes. On the second mount, a man kept firing by hand until his mount captain stopped him, and two more went into the water. Seven torpedoes were gone and none of them hit. Three were left.

They were still running when her radar reported another, heavier column to the southwest. Then the gunnery officer saw the battleship sharp on the port bow. It was the leading ship in a column of four, the report says, and he identified it as Kongo class. The captain and the officer of the deck made out the second ship as a battleship as well.

Hathaway turned left, toward them. The five-inch guns shifted to the leading battleship. A fifty-four pound shell could not get through a battleship's armor. The torpedoes could, and the crew made the last three ready.

The numbers set on the torpedo director are in the report. Target bearing three five zero. Range forty-four hundred yards. Target speed twenty knots. The torpedoes were still set to run six feet deep. Nobody had identified the target as a battleship in time to change it. All three ran hot, straight and normal.

About three minutes later the gunnery officer and the rangefinder operator saw what they took for a hit, on the battleship's starboard quarter under her after turret. Hathaway reported it in good faith. The Japanese records say the battleship evaded every torpedo Heermann fired.

The record of Yamato's movements, compiled from Japanese sources, tells what happened next. It says Heermann fired three torpedoes at the battleship Haruna. They missed Haruna and kept going, toward Yamato, and her lookouts saw the tracks to starboard. Yamato turned away to port. With torpedoes running alongside her, she could not turn back until they ran out of fuel, so she steamed north, away from the American carriers. For almost ten minutes, by the Navy's history, the biggest battleship afloat was heading the wrong way, and Admiral Kurita was aboard her, out of the battle he was supposed to be directing.

Nobody in Heermann knew it. In the paragraphs of his report that cover the attack, Hathaway claims a hit that never happened, and says nothing about the turn that did. He could not see it.

That claim needs three cautions. First, the Navy's history of Heermann says Yamato was forced out of the action altogether. That goes too far. Robert Lundgren's twenty fourteen study of the battle, built on Japanese records, has her back in range at about ten past eight, and her shells helped sink the escort carrier Gambier Bay. Second, accounts drawn from Lundgren give the torpedoes that turned her to Hoel, or to both destroyers, and the Navy's history has Yamato caught between two spreads. Hoel was attacking the battleships in those same minutes. By then Japanese shells had wrecked her bridge and one of her engines, and she fired the rest of her torpedoes anyway. Third, Heermann never aimed at Yamato at all. She aimed at the leading battleship of the column, and the misses did the work.

Against that, the record of Yamato's movements names Heermann. So does Rear Admiral Samuel Cox, the Navy's director of naval history, who wrote that her attack bluffed Yamato into turning away, and that it took the Japanese agonizing minutes to get their flagship back into the fight. Ten minutes was a long time that morning. Kurita had ordered a general attack, and his ships were chasing the carriers in no formation at all. The longer his flagship was pointed the wrong way, the less of the battle he could see.

Heermann broke off from the battleships at three minutes past eight and went back to the carriers, laying smoke as she ran. She was under fire the whole way. Hathaway chased the salvoes, his report says, to make the shooting harder for the enemy. Then Sprague ordered his escorts to engage the cruisers that were firing on the carriers from their port quarter.

On the way she met Johnston. Evans's ship had been hit hard by then, and she signaled Heermann: only one engine, no gyro, no radars. Soon afterward the two destroyers were bow to bow in the smoke. Heermann backed emergency full again. Hathaway wrote that Johnston's bow missed Heermann's by about three inches, and that a very loud spontaneous cheer went up from the men on deck in both ships. An account of Johnston's fight puts the gap at less than ten feet. Either way it was the last time the two crews were that close.

Heermann was still backing away when she sighted a cruiser twelve thousand yards off her port bow. Gambier Bay lay between them. The carrier was listing about twenty degrees and burning amidships. Heermann opened fire with her forward guns, and the cruiser shifted its fire to her.

Her gunnery officer identified the ship as a Tone-class heavy cruiser at the head of a column. For the next few minutes at least four ships were shooting at Heermann. Her officers could count them by the dye, because the splashes came up red, yellow, green and with no color at all. Hathaway was conning the ship from the gun director platform, and the near misses kept drenching it. He wrote that he wished he had a periscope to see over the wall of water. Everything looked rosy, he added, but only because the splashes were colored red.

Heermann was now where a screening ship is meant to be, between the enemy and the carriers, and she was paying for it. At a quarter to nine a shell hit the pilot house. It killed three men and fatally wounded a fourth. It also destroyed the quartermaster's notebook for the hour and three quarters since seven o'clock, which is one reason the times in this story are not exact.

More hits landed forward, eight-inch shells by the Navy's history, and one of her guns was knocked out. Lundgren adds two fourteen-inch near misses from the battleship Kongo, bursting under her keel. The forward part of the ship flooded, and the Navy's history says her bow was pulled down so far that her anchors were dragging in the water. The other four guns kept firing.

At two minutes past nine the cruiser turned sharply away to the east, with a large fire burning on her stern. The Navy's history names her as Chikuma. Heermann did not sink her. Samuel B. Roberts had been shooting at the same ship, and Lundgren credits the two of them with some two hundred five-inch hits on her. Then a torpedo from a carrier plane wrecked her rudder and one propeller, and she went down later that day. The Navy's history shares the credit between Heermann's guns and the aircraft.

Around ten past nine, just before she stopped firing, her gunnery officer thought he saw the other two destroyers. Johnston was two thousand yards away and burning amidships. Hoel was farther off. Both had their masts shot away and hanging over the superstructure, and both appeared to be under way, under constant fire. He may have been wrong about one of them. By Lundgren's account, Hoel had rolled over and sunk at five to nine. Hathaway's report gives them one more sentence. These vessels were not sighted again.

At seventeen minutes past nine Sprague ordered two small boys to get on the port bow of the formation, and make smoke. Small boys was his word for his screening ships. Hathaway wrote that he knew Heermann was the most effective destroyer left, and he took her across with all possible speed, laying smoke as she went.

Then the shooting stopped. At about twenty past nine Kurita ordered all his ships to turn north. By Admiral Cox's account, his cruisers and destroyers were just then closing in for the kill.

When Sprague told his ships to re-form, one of the destroyer escorts asked the screen commander where to go. Hathaway had been trying to find Hoel and Johnston. He called the screen commander on the radio and got no answer. So, his report says, the commanding officer assumed that he was then the senior officer present in the screen. He gave the orders himself.

Only then did anyone have time to look at the ship. Heermann was noticeably down by the bow, and Hathaway reported it to the admiral. Just before ten he asked permission to slow down. The bulkheads forward were about to give way. Heermann stopped for forty-five minutes while her crew shored them up, and they found she was flooded back to frame forty-two and down about five feet by the bow.

She was limping back toward the carriers when a Japanese plane flew into the flight deck of Saint Lo, one of the escort carriers. It was one of the first organized kamikaze attacks of the war. Saint Lo blew up and sank, and Heermann and the three surviving destroyer escorts spent four hours pulling men out of the water. Heermann took aboard seventy-two men and eight officers, the carrier's captain among them. That evening she and the destroyer escort Dennis, which was also flooded forward, were on their way to the Palau Islands. Fifteen knots was the best the two of them could make.

The men of the ships she could not find had a harder time. Partly because of communication errors, and because the plane that spotted them radioed back the wrong position, a very large number of the survivors of Hoel, Johnston, Samuel B. Roberts and Gambier Bay were not picked up for two days. Hoel lost two hundred fifty-three of her crew, and eighty-six lived. Johnston lost one hundred eighty-six of three hundred twenty-seven, Commander Evans among them, and he received the Medal of Honor after his death. In all, counting the kamikaze attacks on the escort carrier groups that day, the Americans lost eleven hundred sixty-one men killed and missing.

So what did one tin can do that morning? She did not sink a ship by herself, and she did not hit a battleship with a torpedo. She was not alone, and it was the escort carriers' planes that sank the three cruisers Kurita lost that day. Why he turned north has been argued ever since. Admiral Cox lists many reasons, and one of them is how badly the escorts, and above all the aircraft, had hurt his ships.

What Heermann did was her job, at a range nobody had ever intended. She went at his cruisers, then at his battleships, then at his cruisers again, and in that last fight she was one of the ships between the Japanese cruisers and the carriers. Five of the six carriers lived through the gunfire. The historian Samuel Eliot Morison wrote that in no engagement of its entire history has the United States Navy shown more gallantry, guts and gumption than in those two morning hours off Samar. Admiral Nimitz put it another way. He wrote that the success of Taffy Three was nothing short of special dispensation from the Lord Almighty.

Taffy Three received the Presidential Unit Citation. It singles out the two destroyers and the destroyer escort that charged the battleships and went down. It has no separate line for the destroyer that made the same charge and lived. Hathaway received the Navy Cross.

Heermann was overhauled at Mare Island. The yard finished with her on January fifteenth, nineteen forty-five, and she went back to the western Pacific. She joined the fast carriers, stood radar and antisubmarine picket duty off Iwo Jima, and guarded the carriers off Okinawa. On August fifteenth, several hours after the end of the fighting was announced, a kamikaze came out of a cloud and dived at her, two hundred miles from Tokyo. Her gunners shot it down, in what the Navy's history calls one of the final naval actions of the war.

She had a long life after that. In April nineteen fifty-six she was in the harbor at Monaco, by invitation, for the wedding of Prince Rainier and Grace Kelly, and forty of her sailors formed the honor guard. In nineteen sixty-one she was transferred to Argentina, where she served as Almirante Brown until nineteen eighty-two.

Yamato never fired her big guns at a ship again. Less than six months after Samar, American carrier planes sank her on her way to Okinawa. The destroyer credited with turning her away outlived her by thirty-seven years.

Heermann left Samar with ten empty torpedo tubes and nothing sunk to show for them. Seven of those torpedoes went at a cruiser, two of them by accident. The last three went at a battleship from forty-four hundred yards. They missed, and by the record of her own movements, Yamato turned away from them.

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